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Abstract
The triumphant Canadian women’s constitution 
fight was a “political earthquake.” Massive lobbying 
efforts created or amended, inserted, and defended 
two sections relevant to sex equality—sections 15 
and 28—in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Responses from both provincial and federal 
governments included the appointment in 1982 of 
the first woman justice of the Supreme Court, Bertha 
Wilson. A series of court challenges under section 15 
resulted in a legal earthquake with respect to equal 
treatment for sexual preference. The presence of women 
justices on the Canadian Supreme Court—a political 
change—may produce the level of scrutiny  that section 
28 was intended to invoke.
Résumé 
Le combat constitutionnel triomphant des femmes 
canadiennes a été un « cataclysme politique ». Les efforts 
massifs de lobbying ont permis de créer ou de modifier, 
d’insérer et de protéger deux articles pertinents à 
l’égalité des sexes—les articles 15 et 28—dans la Charte 
canadienne des droits et libertés. Les réactions du 
gouvernement fédéral et des gouvernements provinciaux 
ont comporté la nomination, en 1982, de la première 
femme juge à la Cour suprême, Bertha Wilson. Une 
série de contestations judiciaires en vertu de l’article 15 
a provoqué un cataclysme juridique en ce qui concerne 
l’égalité du traitement face à l’orientation sexuelle. La 
présence de femmes juges à la Cour suprême du Canada 
—un changement politique—pourrait entraîner le 
degré de minutie que l’article 28 visait à invoquer.
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In The Taking of Twenty-Eight (1983), I called 
the triumphant Canadian women’s constitution fight a 
“political earthquake.” By that I did mean political, in 
that, afterwards, the federal Liberal government and all 
the provincial governments professed and demonstrated 
a sudden deep respect for the depth and breadth of 
activist women’s networks. For example, the previously 
resistant Liberals changed their minds about putting 
the first woman on the Supreme Court and appointed 
Bertha Wilson in March 1982, a month before the new 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) came into 
force.
At the same time, I would argue that the second 
wave of feminism had already visited an earthquake on 
the legal profession, beginning in the 1970s. Citing the 
Canadian Bar Association, Mary Jane Mossman (2005) 
wrote: “Although only 3.2 percent of the practising 
profession was female in 1971, the percentage of female 
practitioners in 1986 was already 16 percent” (18-
19). Because second-wave feminists knocked down 
law schools’ traditional barriers to women, there were 
enough women with the legal expertise to analyse the 
proposed Charter’s “Non-Discrimination” wording 
as initially presented on the basis of Bill of Rights 
precedents—and reject it. Moreover, because other 
university barriers fell at the same time, there was a solid 
core of educated women from all kinds of backgrounds 
who understood the significance of a constitutional 
equality guarantee. Kathleen Mahoney (1994) told the 
Australian Parliament:
During the 1970s the Supreme Court of Canada decided 
ten cases under [the 1960 Diefenbaker Bill of Rights]. In 
nine of the cases, the Court declined to find any breaches 
of ‘equality before the law’ or the ‘equal protection of the 
law’ guarantees. Needless to say, equality seekers were 
disheartened by this result. It appeared to them that 
the Bill of Rights was more an instrument to perpetuate 
inequality than one to redress past inequities and promote 
reform. (50)
However, as Mahoney continued, “Canadian women 
have never willingly accepted legally imposed invisibility 
and disadvantage” (49). She explained: “After a massive 
lobbying effort, two sections relevant to sex equality 
were incorporated into the Charter. They were section 
15 and section 28, which read as follows:
Section 15(1): Every individual is equal before and under 
the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or 
activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions 
of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those 
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability.
Section 28: Notwithstanding anything in the Charter, 
the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons. (54)
Mahoney’s summary of the transition from the Bill of 
Rights to the Charter continued as follows: 
Insertion of the guarantee of equality ‘under’ the law was 
considered to be essential in order to avoid the result 
reached in the Bliss and Lavell cases. It was thought 
that this guarantee would ensure that constitutional 
review would reach the substance of laws as well as their 
procedure. The guarantee of ‘equal benefit’ of the law was 
proposed to overcome the Bliss holding which permitted 
Parliament to differentiate as long as a benefit rather than 
a burden was conferred by legislation. (54)
The spontaneous Women’s Constitutional 
Conference was stunning, with professionals in front 
and other activists behind the scenes. I recall one press 
conference where lawyer Marilou McPhedran removed 
her blazer and scarf so that a woman in a tee-shirt 
and jeans could wear them for the TV cameras. The 
lobbying that followed involved some guerilla tactics 
too. When article 28 was about to be voted on, a dozen 
Ad Hockers slipped into the House of Commons, 
counting on the guards to assume they were some of the 
many anonymous women on the Hill. The women were 
dressed demurely in dark A-line skirts and cardigans—
Ottawa secretaries’ uniform at the time. As MPs entered 
the Chamber, they were handed ivory “invitations” with 
a Picasso butterfly on the front and closed with a gold 
seal. Inside they found a card which said, in part, “WE 
INVITE YOU to further strengthen the Charter with 
respect to women’s equality. We will be watching closely 
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in the days ahead to see how you respond to the needs 
of Canadian women” (Kome 1983, 77).
The core group in the women’s constitution fight 
included McPhedran (who was awarded the Order of 
Canada for her part), Pat Hacker, Linda Ryan Nye, and 
Tamra Thomson. A much broader group of women 
undertook the hard slogging that won many legal 
victories before section 15 actually came into force 
(Kome 1983, 58-59).  Governments had demanded and 
gotten a three-year moratorium on section 15 so they 
could vet their own legislation and cull out the overtly 
sexist parts. Women generously stepped forward 
and offered to help legislators identify inequitable 
laws. Women law students across Canada pored over 
provincial statutes and prepared cases that persuaded 
jurisdictions to change their laws even before the April 
17, 1985 deadline—cases such as Yukon’s Married 
Woman’s Name Act, which required married women 
to take their husbands’ names, or the Ontario Man in 
the House Rule, where social services regulations stated 
that the presence of a man in the household affected a 
woman’s eligibility for social assistance—even if he was 
just a financially-necessary roommate.
The women’s legal review groups disbanded 
once the review was complete. Soon, however, a new 
organization emerged. Future Senator Nancy Ruth 
dressed as a tap-dancing tree, covered with leaves, to 
introduce the Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund (LEAF) at the April 17, 1982 celebration of the 
Charter’s Proclamation. And while men have indeed 
launched the majority of sex-equality challenges 
under the Charter, non-profit organizations like LEAF 
and EGALE Canada (formerly Gays and Lesbians 
Everywhere) have punched way above their weight by 
winning status as interveners in Supreme Court cases, 
representing the public interest in cases that are often 
intensely personal.
Whether achieving sections 15 and 28 
constituted a legal earthquake remains open to debate. 
Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day (1989) argued the 
contrary. They pointed out that men actually placed 
most of the equality court challenges in family areas, 
such as community property, and criminal areas, such 
as sexual assault—areas where court decisions based on 
very narrow technical grounds could put women’s hard-
won respect at risk in the name of equality. McPhedran 
and other feminist lawyers have said that Canada has 
developed a new and distinctive definition of “equality,” 
based on “equal benefit and protection” as well as equal 
opportunity, perhaps because of the combination of a 
fairly sympathetic Supreme Court, a failsafe definition 
in the text, and feminist legal interventions. According 
to Mahoney (1994), 
The Court’s statement that identical treatment can 
accentuate inequality incorporates the idea that neutral 
laws or policies can violate section 15 if they have a 
disparate impact on disadvantaged individuals or groups. 
This result-oriented approach expands the protective ambit 
of the equality guarantees under the Charter substantially 
beyond that permitted by the equal protection doctrine 
adopted under the Bills of Rights in both Canada and the 
United States. (57)
One outstanding change that section 15 
made possible for Canada is in the area of gay rights 
or, more properly, gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans, 
queer, questioning, and intersex rights, which I will 
call LGBTQ rights for brevity. Brenda Cossman 
(2002) has pointed out that legal equality is a great 
starting point even though many issues remain 
unresolved: “The Charter has been an effective tool 
in challenging the denial of formal legal equality of 
lesbians and gay men…legislatures have been forced 
to amend their laws to extend formal legal equality” 
(224).
I have a vivid recollection of McPhedran 
explaining that women wanted to use the Charter the 
way that the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) won equality in the United 
States—by building case law, one carefully chosen case 
at a time. There was no single Canadian women’s group 
that was the strategist for LGBTQ rights. However, as 
Cossman (2002) has written, many activists planned 
“to pursue incremental equality by developing the 
jurisprudence in relation to unmarried cohabitants, and 
only turning to marriage once that victory was in hand” 
(236). A series of cases cropped up on their own. LEAF 
and the National Association of Women and the Law 
(NAWL) intervened in some cases and EGALE Canada 
intervened in twenty-four cases, including eleven 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, a handful 
of organizations delivered a consistent message to the 
courts on this issue.
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Another difference from the NAACP’s 
experience was that, with the weight of section 15 
on the side of equality, the LGBTQ cases added up 
to a declaration of legal equality in less than twenty 
years. Cossman (2002) has written: “Doctrinally, 
conservative judges focused on biological differences 
to justify the exclusion of same-sex couples while 
more progressive judges focused on the equality of 
same-sex relationships and the recognition of diverse 
family forms” (226). While this conversation around 
biology initially dominated same-sex marriage cases, 
eventually the relationship theory won. Equality 
seekers lost two early cases at the Supreme Court that 
later became significant, Mossop and Egan. While 
Mossop did not invoke section 15, Justice Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissenting opinion was the first to 
spell out that family is about relationships not gender. 
This set the stage for James Egan’s lawsuit to win a 
spousal pension for his partner, John Norris Nesbit. 
In a 5 – 4 opinion, the majority held that the equality 
rights of Egan and Nesbit under section 15 had been 
violated. But they also voted 5 – 4 that this violation 
was reasonable under section 1. In other words, it was 
a violation, but one that was “demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society.” Cossman called this “a 
ground-breaking victory within a defeat” (229).
Both of the aforementioned cases were anchored 
in family settings. The Vriend case was the turning point 
perhaps, in part, because, by contrast, it was a question 
of employment. Fired from his job at a Christian college 
because he was gay, Delwin Vriend brought a challenge 
to the Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act for failing 
to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed 
and took the extraordinary step of “reading in” sexual 
orientation rights into section 15. This set the stage 
for M v. H, a Family Law Act case about division of 
property between a lesbian couple who had separated. 
The majority of the court agreed that the two women 
had indeed had a common-law marriage and their 
separation was governed by section 29 of the Family 
Law Act. Therefore, the judges struck down that section. 
Cossman (2002) has argued that, “Within six years, the 
spirit of the powerful dissent from Mossop had become 
the majority opinion” (235).
Some LGBTQ folks find this kind of equality too 
“assimilationist.” They say they have their own cultures 
and their own standards for relationships. Egan and 
Norris, for instance, avoided mention of monogamy 
in their claim for equal pensions. Nor has gay bashing 
disappeared with the addition of sexual orientation to 
the Criminal Code section on hate crimes. But overall, 
section 15 has brought progress and made Canada a 
world leader in recognizing LGBTQ rights. By contrast, 
the United States is still struggling with impediments 
to recognizing LGBTQ equality. And this brings us to 
the question of section 28. This section of the Canadian 
Charter was intended to operate as the equivalent of 
“heightened scrutiny” or “strict scrutiny” in the United 
States. In the United States, strict scrutiny is the most 
rigorous form of judicial review. Government action 
that violates fundamental freedoms and rights or, as was 
later established, discriminates on the basis of race is 
considered “suspect” from the outset. Those freedoms 
and rights can be violated only for some compelling 
and immediate purpose in the public good (S v. “Strict 
Scrutiny” in West’s Encyclopedia 2008). In November 
2012, when the New York Federal Court of Appeal 
struck down the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 
it also directed that any case involving allegations of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation should 
be subject to “heightened scrutiny” or “strict scrutiny,” a 
level of judicial review that is much more rigorous than 
the usual “reasonable basis” test. 
The review court, the US Supreme Court, 
however, did not mention strict scrutiny in its 2012 
decision about the constitutionality of DOMA.1 Rather, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion leaned 
heavily on states’ right to set their own marriage laws 
even though he had written two of the most important 
Supreme Court decisions involving, and ultimately 
affirming, gay rights: Lawrence v. Texas (2003) and 
Romer v. Evans (1996).2 Kennedy also wrote, in 2012, 
that “DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York 
seeks to protect…By doing so, it violates basic due 
process and equal protection principles applicable to the 
federal government” (See US Consti, Amdt 5, Bolling v. 
Sharpe 347 U.S. 947 (1954)). The 2012 Kennedy decision 
returned again and again to the questions of protection 
and of dignity: 
The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to 
injure those whom the State, by marriage laws, sought to 
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protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace 
this protection and treating those persons as living in 
marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment.3
The concept of “equal protection” also appears 
in decisions written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
(who, in July 1981, was the first woman appointed to the 
US Supreme Court). The reference is to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which contains the Equal Protection 
Clause, a directive to the states to keep persons safe: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.4 (emphasis added). 
Supreme Court rulings under the Equal Protection 
Clause have involved differential treatment of hippies 
and people of colour as well as (in Lawrence v. Texas) 
a law that forbade homosexual, but not heterosexual 
sodomy. Another noteworthy aspect of the 2012 
decision was that the three women justices supported 
Justice Kennedy’s position. Justices Elena Kagan, Sonia 
Sotomayor, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined Kennedy’s 
majority opinion, along with Justice Stephen Breyer.
Section 28 does achieve three things that the Ad 
Hoc conference wanted: it specifically puts the words 
“equality between male and female” into the Charter 
and it emphasizes the word “persons” which, as we all 
know, is defined as someone “born alive” from their 
mother. Most of all, this section was intended to be an 
“interpretive” clause, directing the courts to look very 
closely at any case alleging discrimination on the basis 
of gender. However, so far, section 28 has not been cited 
effectively in gender equality cases. 
This is where the political earthquake makes a 
difference. In her speech, “Will Women Judges Really 
Make a Difference?,” Justice Bertha Wilson answered 
her own question strongly in the affirmative (Cameron 
2007). She went on to prove her point in R. v. Lavallee 
where her own work introduced the concept of a 
“battered wife” into Canadian law (Benedet 2013, 2). 
“Numbers do count,” Justice Marie Deschamps said, 
when she stepped down from the Supreme Court: “I 
was sad that I was not replaced by a woman. We are 
looked at not just as a model for the courts in Canada, 
but around the world—and I think it’s very important 
that the Supreme Court of Canada remains a model” 
(Makin 2013). Perhaps the presence of so many women 
justices on the Canadian Supreme Court can produce 
the level of scrutiny that section 28 was intended 
to invoke. “The public must perceive judges as fair, 
impartial and representative of the public,” said Bertha 
Wilson. She quoted Diane Martin who reported that 
women judges view women lawyers as “normal” as 
compared to male judges who need points translated 
into “man language” (Cameron 2007). Canadians who 
care about the spirit of section 28 should keep pressure 
on the federal government to appoint more women to 
all courts and especially to the Supreme Court.
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